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Abstract: Writing desktop applications in JavaScript offers developers the opportunity to write
cross-platform applications with cutting edge capabilities. However in doing so, they are potentially
submitting their code to a number of unsanctioned modifications from malicious actors. Electron
is one such JavaScript application framework which facilitates this multi-platform out-the-box
paradigm and is based upon the Node.js JavaScript runtime — an increasingly popular server-side
technology. In bringing this technology to the client-side environment, previously unrealized risks
are exposed to users due to the powerful system programming interface that Node.js exposes. In a
concerted effort to highlight previously unexposed risks in these rapidly expanding frameworks,
this paper presents the Mayall Framework, an extensible toolkit aimed at JavaScript security
auditing and post-exploitation analysis. The paper also exposes fifteen highly popular Electron
applications and demonstrates that two thirds of applications were found to be using known
vulnerable elements with high CVSS scores. Moreover, this paper discloses a wide-reaching and
overlooked vulnerability within the Electron Framework which is a direct byproduct of shipping
the runtime unaltered with each application, allowing malicious actors to modify source code and
inject covert malware inside verified and signed applications without restriction. Finally, a number
of injection vectors are explored and appropriate remediations are proposed.
Keywords: JavaScript; Node.js; security vulnerabilities, arbitrary code execution; post-exploitation.
1. Introduction
Application designers often seek to produce high quality, cross platform applications in order to
maximize their customer base. This introduces a number of difficulties regarding code reuse, with
applications having to be modified, re-written or recompiled for each individual operating system.
Enter the explosion of new, fashionable languages and their counterpart interpreters and
compilers. Such ‘write once, run everywhere’ languages, with their multi-platform out-the-box
paradigm, attempt to revolutionize the way in which native applications are developed. These
languages, such as Go and Node.js, have garnered rapid popularity through their inherent power
and ease of development [1]. In the case of Node.js, this rapid rate of expansion brought with it a
staggering number of modules and frameworks, along with an ever growing list of security issues.
Electron is one such framework aiming to bring this JavaScript runtime to the native operating
system, unifying web technologies and distilling them into what is effectively a native executable. In
doing so, developers are not only potentially opening themselves up to traditional web exploits such
as Single-Origin Policy misconfiguration [2] — albeit this time in the much more dangerous context
of the operating system — but also exploits that are unique to the framework in question.
Frameworks such as Electron, NW.js and to some extent, the Chrome Embedded Framework, are
rapidly expanding and as such, it is important to address the security surrounding these products.
There has been an increasing number of recent discoveries and events which bring into question the
level of focus on the security surrounding the modules available on npm, the de facto standard for
Node.js package management. As Electron is beginning to emerge as the clear winner of the two
Node.js based frameworks, this paper will focus predominantly on the security surrounding Electron
and the increasingly popular applications which are built upon it.
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When contemporary frameworks grow at such exponential rates, including adoption from major
players such as Microsoft [3], NVIDIA [4] and Slack [5], it is crucial that the security awareness
surrounding the product does not go amiss. This reliance on the Node.js JavaScript runtime and
the package manager that is used so prolifically with it compounds the security issues, as it adds
additional levels of complexity which each require individual consideration with regards to security.
There is comparatively little in the way of security research for Node.js and its accompanying
frameworks when set side by side with other native programming languages, and what has been
implemented in the way of security fixes is often reactive, rather than proactive. This is especially
true with regards to the debacle over the kik module in March 2016, where an author unpublished a
package which many other packages depended on [6].
This crucial oversight, highlights a clear need to analyze the platform for other potential issues,
and to consider remediations for them before they occur. By investigating the method by which
dependencies are handled and the way in which code is executed, the Mayall framework 1 presented
in this paper allows developers to do just that. This paper explores the current state of security
surrounding the Electron framework and the underlying Node.js constructs and demonstrates real
world risks associated with this through the introduction of a post-exploitation framework built in
Node.js, leveraging the modular structure of the language. The contributions from this paper are
threefold:
1. An exploit which can take advantage of popular Electron based applications such Slack,
Discord, etc.
2. An investigation of issues inherent of the Electron Framework.
3. An Open Source Extensible Security framework for analyzing Node.js applications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, an assessment of the current
state of JavaScript security is performed and categories of vulnerabilities, language constructs and
application management are discussed. This current review is taken further in section 3 where we
expose the vulnerabilities of fifteen popular applications built with Electron, moreover we present
a proof of concept exploit which allows us to take advantage of Electron based applications. The
results from the audit are presented in section 4 and a discussion on how to remediate the risks from
exploitation is proposed in section 5.
2. Background and related work
JavaScript security is a long discussed and multi-faceted affair; this is no different within the
context of the Electron and Node.js runtimes. Now that the JavaScript language can be run natively,
outwith the context of the browser, additional security concerns are brought to the fore. This is
compounded by the rapid growth experienced by both JavaScript and Node.js over the past few
years; JavaScript has consistently been top of the most popular technologies in the Developer Survey
Results produced by [7].
This section explores the current security themes that are directly affecting the Node.js landscape.
Specific examples are drawn upon where applicable to highlight the relevance of these themes when
applied to Node.js. Whilst on the surface it may appear that some of these examples are self contained
and acutely specific, the general risks discussed can be applied to Node.js and its desktop application
counterpart, Electron. It is therefore important to discuss these precursor attacks that have direct
relevance to these new languages and frameworks going forward.
1 Named after the astronomical body, Mayall’s Object, which consists of two colliding galaxies, the framework’s primary
aim is to inject a module into the original application and modify its execution.
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2.1. Web based JavaScript
When looking at traditional web-only based applications written in JavaScript, there are a series
of recurring patterns that introduce a possibility for security vulnerabilities. For example, contained
within JavaScript are a set of functions which allow for dynamic parsing and production of JavaScript
code, the primary of which is eval(). One particular study by Richards textitet al. took a large
sample of the top 10,000 websites and discovered that 89% of them used JavaScript. Furthermore,
they discovered that “over 82% of the top 100 pages use eval, and 50% of the remaining 10,000 pages do as
well” [8]. The primary issue that occurs with the use of eval is when arbitrary and unsanitized user
data is passed to the function. When this occurs, it is possible for an attacker to execute the string they
provide to the web application as JavaScript code. Whilst static code analysis often highlights security
issues within an application, this becomes more challenging when dynamic elements such as eval
are introduced. One method of analyzing such code is to perform an automatic transformation of
“many common uses of eval into other language constructs with the use of a dataflow analyzer” [9]. These
transformations are able to make some headway towards restoring the effectiveness of static code
analysis on JavaScript applications. This is as a direct result of reducing the number of malleable
and untrusted variables within the code, which subsequently reduces the number of mechanisms
available to exploit such code.
While eval() is arguably the most relevant security risk when applied to modern
cross-platform JavaScript applications due to it’s alarming prevalence in Node.js, there still remain a
large number of additional JavaScript vulnerabilities that apply to both web and desktop JavaScript,
the most common of which is cross-site scripting (XSS) [10]. Marked as third in the OWASP Top 10
vulnerabilities list, XSS works similarly to injection vulnerabilities (such as those described above)
in that it arises from a mishandling of user input and can result in arbitrary JavaScript execution
within the web application [11]. Furthermore, JavaScript is used in the development of browser
add-ons i.e. Web Extensions in Mozilla Firefox. Such vulnerabilities have the potential to allow for
the development of malicious extensions, posing a security risk [12].
2.2. Node.js and Electron
2.2.1. Node.js
Node.js is a JavaScript runtime that is built upon the V8 JavaScript engine developed by
Google. Its primary aim is to provide a highly scalable environment on which JavaScript code can
be run, allowing it to be deployed on desktop and server-side environments. Its focus is driven
towards asynchronicity and concurrency in handling a large volume of connections whilst preventing
thread-locks within the application [13]. It can be reasoned that Node.js is more akin to a standard
library than a web framework and is comparable to PHP, Ruby or Python rather than the frameworks
that run atop these platforms such as Laravel, Ruby on Rails and Flask. This is an idea bolstered by
Eloff et al. and his analysis of Node.js as a baseline platform for web services [14].
Its adoption by commercial players such as Uber [15] and Netflix, [16] amongst others has helped
to springboard the language towards success.
As it aims to be a powerful programming language in its own right, this requires it to contain
a number of libraries and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that allow it to perform “low
level networking, basic HTTP server functionality, file system operations, compression and many other common
tasks” [17][18]. As a result of this, the exec() command was introduced to the Node.js specification
in order to expose shell interaction functionality on the operating system level. Similar to the way
eval() works, data that is provided to exec() is interpreted as a command, however it is passed to
the operating system shell rather than the JavaScript engine [19].
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2.2.2. Electron
The Electron framework is an open source library designed for cross-platform application
development in web based languages HTML, CSS and JavaScript [20]. It combines Chromium and
Node.js into a single package so that traditional back-end and front-end code can be run within a
single runtime environment.
A basic Electron application consists of three components: the package.json file, the Electron
executable binary and the JavaScript source code.
2.3. Node Security
The tendency for writing insecure eval statements is not a scenario that is just limited to the
web — desktop JavaScript is also affected by this [19]. As we see an increase in desktop JavaScript
applications being shipped (examples include the increasingly popular Slack and Discord [5]), the
programming paradigms that were popular on the web, are also unsurprisingly popular on desktop
frameworks. The transference of such insecure coding practices are dangerously widespread as
Staicu et al. show [19]. The study was carried out across a sample set of 235,850 Node.js modules.
Their results demonstrate that approximately 20% of these modules made use of the potentially
unsafe eval() and exec() API calls directly or indirectly after all the first and second level
dependencies were accounted for. A reasonable majority of these modules did not directly call these
APIs however, with only 3% and 4% of the sample calling the exec() and eval() APIs directly —
the remainder were run within the module dependent code [19].
Whilst popular belief may lead to the conclusion that these insecure modules are unpopular, this
hypothesis is challenged by the discovery that the contrary is true and that in fact “various vulnerable
modules and injection modules are highly popular, exposing millions of users to the risk of injections” [19].
The immediacy of these findings does not present itself until it is noted that the sandboxes
present in the web browsing environments (such as Chrome and Firefox) are not present within
the Electron framework [21] and that any application running on Node.js has full system access
equivalent to the account that is running the process.
2.4. The npm Registry and Module Security
When the number of external includes present in an application increases, so does the potential
for unchecked vulnerabilities and the level of trust placed in unknown module authors. This idea is
backed up by research into remote inclusions which put forward the important notion that “whenever
developers of a web application decide to include a library from a third-party provider, they allow the latter to
execute code with the same level of privilege as their own code” [22]. The package management system
that is used for Node.js is known as npm and is where the vast majority of Node modules reside.
Additionally, as part of the module install process, npm exposes the functionality to run additional
scripts on the target machine [23]. These so-called preinstall and postinstall scripts have
historically been a cause for concern within the npm registry and Node.js landscape. These script
hooks introduce a new danger to the npm and Node.js environment as the scripts will run on the host
with the same privileges as the user installing the module.
2.4.1. Typosquatting
Tschacher et al. brings to light the dangers of typosquatting within package managers in
his dissertation he explores the malicious module that was released into the npm registry by a
malware author on 26th January, 2015 [24][25]. The module in question was known as rimrafall
and contained “a preinstall hook that executed the command rm -rf /*” [26][17]. As a result of
this pre-install hook, any unsuspecting user that entered npm install rimrafall in a terminal
prompt would end up with all their files being deleted from the machine. Whilst this module was
removed from the registry less than two hours after being published, it does highlight the risks
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present in blindly requiring2 numerous modules into a project. The primary goal of this module
appeared to be to highlight that “npm install can be as dangerous as curl dangerous.com |
sh” [27].
Whilst Lift Security provide tools to actively monitor modules that are required as well as
systematically audit the most popular modules present on npm [26], the fact still exists that malicious
modules can be introduced to the npm registry. Although methods exist to prevent scripts from
running on install, the majority of users simply do not apply these checks when requiring modules
into their codebase [24].
This lack of concern and consideration employed by some developers is evidenced in research
performed on the effectiveness of typosquatting in a wide range of package managers for a multitude
of different languages. 214 different packages were uploaded to the respective registries with typos
in their names, each of which acquired 92 installations on average per package [24]. Whilst this may
not sound like much, “the most installed package (urllib2) received 3929 unique installations in almost 2
weeks” and “the most installed package per day was bs4 with 366 unique daily installations on average” [24].
What is more alarming is the origin where these downloads occurred, as well as the prevalence of
installs that were run with administrative privileges. It was found that 43.6% of module downloads
and inclusions were run with administrative rights [24], thereby giving the accompanying install
hooks administrative access on the machines where they were installed. In addition to the checking of
administrative rights, [24] performed reverse DNS lookups with the installed module and discovered
that his module had been installed on a surprising number of government and educational domains.
2.4.2. Trojan Modules
In addition to the direct installs of first level dependencies and the evident risks associated
with directly installing unchecked code, there exists a risk of hidden malware further down the
dependency tree. If a malicious author can influence code that is included in a numerous amount
of other modules, the infection rate will be vastly increased. This exact scenario has occurred in the
past on a variety of modules, however [22] points to a specific instance with popular jQuery plugin,
qTip2. Nikiforakis et al. state that “The qTip2 library was modified, and the malicious version was
distributed for 33 days” [22]. The compromised code made frequent callbacks to a specific IP address
located in Russia and transmitted data including “[the] site’s hostname, [the browser’s] user agent, and
the referer” [28].
These types of risk are not exclusive to WordPress and the web environment, this threat has
presented itself in the npm registry. An npm developer encountered legal issues with Kik Interactive
Inc. — developers of Kik Messenger — when he published a module under the name ‘kik’. The npm
developer was unable to come to an agreement with the company and after a fall out with the npm
registry over the use of ‘kik’ as his module name, the developer took the decision to remove all 273
packages that he authored from the registry. As a result of this, thousands of Node.js applications —
including the widely used babel3 library — started issuing dependency errors and failed to execute
[29].
In addition to the breaking changes that were made due to the unpublishing from the npm
registry, the removal of these modules presented an even greater threat. Every single module
name-space that had been removed had now become available for any developer to claim control
over. This allowed any actor, either benevolent or malicious, to potentially inject code into thousands
of Node projects requiring any of the widely used modules that he had authored [6]. npm responded
reflexively by blocking the registration of any of the removed modules as well as applying the same
2 Similar to a Python import statement, a require statement is the equivalent method by which external JavaScript
modules are imported to a JavaScript application.
3 Babel (https://babeljs.io/) is a JavaScript compiler used by Facebook, CloudFlare and Netflix, amongst others.
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tactic to any future removed application, but not before a vast number of modules dropped from the
registry had already been claimed by other developers.
2.5. Developer Attitudes
As with a lot of systems, updating is often an easy way to ensure that applications are free from
vulnerabilities. However this is a major issue with the npm repository. As a result of the codebase
being highly distributed over an exceedingly large number of developers, high code quality and a
guarantee of constant security updates is not always available. Whilst auditing the top npm packages,
[19] discovered a number of vulnerabilities within modules which they responsibly disclosed to the
developers. They stated that “most of the developers acknowledge the problem, and they want to fix it.
However, over the course of several months, only three of the 20 vulnerabilities have been completely fixed.
The majority of issues are still pending, showing the lack of maintenance for many of the modules involved.”.
This lack of maintained code is not the only issue present in the Electron and Node.js landscape;
the prevalence of version pinning also prevents a large majority of applications from being updated
even after vulnerabilities are patched. This has become the mainstream method of dependency
management after GitHub actively recommended “[setting] a fixed version number (1.1.0 instead of
ˆ1.1.0) to ensure that all upgrades of Electron are a manual operation made by the developer” [30]. This
prevents applications suffering when breaking changes are introduced into the Electron framework,
however it does place the onus on the developers to pay attention to updates and manually push
these security fixes to the end users.
The following section expands on the work done by previous researchers, with a sharper focus
on desktop applications written in JavaScript and JavaScript based frameworks, by presenting a
framework centered around the security of Node.js and it’s counterpart front-end, Electron. The
framework is highly extensible and allows for the use of cross-platform payloads for remote execution
of malicious code, taking advantage of the lack of code signing enforcement either remotely or locally.
3. Design and Implementation
This section aims to highlight the stages of development of the framework. The framework
provides two algorithms presented in subsections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Both aim at assisting
a security analyst during an audit with automated JavaScript vulnerability scanning. Additional
security vulnerabilities are brought to the fore in subsection 3.4 with regards to how Electron handles
updating application bundles and an exploit is demonstrated in subsubsection 3.4.3. This notion of
exploit development is expanded further with the production of a fully functional ‘backdoor module’
in subsection 3.5 which discusses the methods by which Node.js malware can be introduced into a
system and is rounded out in subsection 3.6 with the amalgamation of the produced tools into one
cohesive framework that can be used for JavaScript security analysis.
3.1. Application Auditing
Due to the high prevalence of insecure modules present within the npm repository, it is deemed
appropriate to perform an analysis of modules in use by some of the most popular Electron based
applications. Electron applications are bundled into what is known as an asar archive, which is a
concatenation of all files in the source code folder, similar to a tar archive. Electron can then access
files from this archive during execution of the application. The asar package can be installed globally
onto a system by using npm and the command npm install -g asar, after which point the asar
command can be called directly from a terminal prompt. The asar archiving process does not contain
any encryption or obfuscation and the tool is freely available and open source. As a result of this, it
is possible to issue the command asar e app.asar app to retrieve the entire source code folder
for an application, complete with formatting, comments and module dependencies as written by
the developer. It is the latter which is of interest during this phase of the investigation as attempts
will be made to discover if any of the modules contain vulnerabilities. Modules that have been
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required by either the application author directly (henceforth referred to as primary modules) or any of
its dependencies (henceforth referred to as tertiary modules) are located in the node_modules folder
within the decompressed asar archive. Each of these modules contains an individual package.json
file which is specific to that module. This file contains details such as the name, version and author
of the module, but also additional information such as the repository url for that module. Of the
modules surveyed, only a negligible amount of modules did not provide a GitHub repository location
and it was therefore very easy to further analyze these modules through commits and issues present
on the respective repositories.
3.2. appScanner.js
An algorithm was developed to assist in the version analysis of all imported modules, as the
number of tertiary modules can be vastly larger than the number of primary modules, thereby
creating excessive amounts of workload for a manual audit, as shown in section 4. By interfacing
with the GitHub API, it was possible to pinpoint the individual git commit which corresponded to
the release number inside a module’s package.json file. This was done by querying the repository
listed within the package.json file for tagged commits with the version number of the module.
Following this, a comparison of the returned commit to the latest commit on the master branch
was made and a count was returned of the number of commits the master branch was ahead of
the imported module. Modules that were a substantial number of commits behind the master branch
— above or equal to 150 — were considered to be suspect packages and could help an analyst look in
the right places for existing bugs and vulnerabilities which would affect an application.
Although being a large number of commits behind the master branch may at first seem alarming,
a lack of pulled commits may themselves not necessarily indicate a directly actionable exploit or
vulnerability — this idea is discussed in more detail later in subsubsection 5.2.1. If an application
has not been updated to the latest build, it may be to prevent breaking changes rather than a lack of
concern for updating.
3.3. nspCheck.js
While checking how far a module is behind the master branch helps to give indicators to the
security status of an application, a git commit record does not immediately indicate security flaws
within the respective modules without additional analysis. To this end, another algorithm was
developed allowing immediate highlighting of known and reported security vulnerabilities within
a module.
The Node Security Platform maintains a list of security advisories along with a corresponding
API. By comparing the installed module versions against this NSP database, immediate security
vulnerabilities can be flagged to developers. By querying this API and parsing the response data
into an easily human readable format, the algorithm makes strides towards building a toolkit for
security researchers and analysts assessing overall Node.js security within a network.
When auditing for vulnerabilities, it does not suffice to simply check the package.json for
the main application. Although a developer may require only modules that are up-to-date, they are
not directly responsible for the management of multi-level dependencies, with this responsibility
falling to the module author. As a result of this, vulnerabilities can be introduced despite a developer
including only up to date version numbers. This is demonstrated in Theorem 1 and Figure 1, where
it can be seen that whilst the developer has required up-to-date module versions, those modules in
turn could depend on vulnerable code which is subsequently imported into the application.
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Theorem 1. Let A be the main source code, where B, C = 1st are level dependencies and D, E, F = 2nd are
level dependencies. Let Xn be the module version, where n = 1 indicates the most recent version and n = 0
represent outdated versions. Let Xr be the set of requirements for a module.
A ⊃ {B, C} ⊃ {D, E, F}
Ar 7→ B1 ∪ C1
Br 7→ D1
Cr 7→ E1 ∪ F0
∴ A 7→ F0
This demonstrates that a single pinned version requirement further down a dependency tree can result in the
inclusion of outdated modules, despite the developer updating all of their primary dependencies.
Figure 1. Nested dependencies
Figure 1 illustrates the dependency tree of an application, and demonstrates how outdated
modules can be included into top level applications. Nested dependencies can introduce
vulnerabilities through version pinning. Arrows represent dependency calls, while the red and
green sections represent vulnerable and patched module versions respectively. Although an alarming
percentage of the applications tested did contain known vulnerable elements (Table 1), there still were
a number of large name, well known applications which passed this scan with no vulnerabilities
being detected. With this in mind, it was necessary to widen the scope to audit other aspects of the
application processes, one of which was updating.
3.4. Malicious Update Process
Updating Electron applications is typically managed via the Squirrel Framework which is
provided to Electron developers as an interface through the autoUpdater module shipped with
Electron. The update process is not uniform across platforms with the Windows process requiring
additional steps in order to produce the update packages.
3.4.1. Update Electron Packages
When Electron applications are updated on macOS, the only step that is taken is to recompile
the entire application and push it to an update server. This update server is then polled at application
startup by Electron applications running the autoUpdater code. For Windows, it is possible to
create delta packages which contain the changes made since the last version.
The update server follows a specific directory layout where the platform specific updates
are stored in sub-folders for that platform. The Windows subdirectory contains a RELEASES file
which contains a list of packages available on the server in the format ‘SHA1_checksum filename
size_in_bytes’. This RELEASES file is queried by the remote applications at startup to determine if
an update is available. If one of the entries in the RELEASES file contains an application with a greater
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Table 1. An automated scan of the applications against the Node Security Platform advisories list.
The number of advisories may contain duplicate entries if the module has been required more than
once.
Application Total No Advisories Highest CVSS Score
1Clipboard 25 7.5
Atom 25 7.5
Caret 2 7.5
Discord 3 7.5
Ghost 0 —
Hyper 0 —
Mattermost 0 —
MongoDBCompass 17 7.5
NVIDIA 11 7.5
Popcorn Time4 39 7.5
Popkey 7 7.5
Slack 0 —
Tofino Browser 0 —
SteelSeries 1 7.5
Wire Messenger 5 7.5
version number than the one provided by the application, the update process will automatically
download and update to the latest version without any user input required.
Automatic updates on Windows will occur so long as code signing has not previously been put
in place and the version number is higher than the current version performing the update check.
On the other hand, macOS applications will not automatically update unless the update package is
signed with a valid code signature. For this reason, a proof of concept was built on the Windows
platform to eliminate additional overheads which are outwith the scope of this study, namely code
signature bypasses.
3.4.2. Enumerating Update Endpoints
As a result of requiring no user input, it may be possible to covertly install malicious updates
without user interaction. In order to demonstrate the vulnerability, a freely available application built
on the Electron Framework was downloaded and it’s contents extracted with asar e app.asar
app. The code in the resultant app folder was then examined and additional code was inserted. The
added code resulted in the writing of a new file to the user’s home folder on launch.
Due to the lack of code signing in effect on the application, and the lack of a secure HTTPS
connection to the update server, it was possible to man-in-the-middle (MITM) the entire update
process. When the application was launched, the connection request to the remote update server was
intercepted and handled by a rogue update server that mimicked the responses that the application
was expecting.
In order to build this rogue server, the update endpoints needed to be determined. This was
achieved by setting an HTTP server handling all requests from the application. By modifying the
hosts file to redirect the target application to localhost, all URL endpoints could be enumerated by
the rogue server. It was subsequently possible to recreate the folder structure required for a Windows
update and have the rogue server resolve the requests made by the insecure application.
3.4.3. Building Malicious Updates
The Windows update process involves downloading a delta package (a package containing the
changes made since the last version) or, if one is unavailable, a complete package from the server. The
package system in use is based on the Windows NuGet Package Manager and application updates
are provided to the Squirrel Framework as .nupkg files.
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A .nupkg file is compressed in the same way as a .zip folder and contains the source code
for the application along with associated metadata such as version numbers. By unzipping the full
nupkg file for the most recent version of the application and modifying the metadata and source code,
a fully functional update could be created and served by the rogue server.
As a result of these steps, the application automatically updated on launch to the ‘most recent
version’ as supplied to it by the rogue server, thereby writing a file to the user’s home folder. As a
presumed formality, the application presented the user with a dialog box informing that an update
was available and asked the user if they would like to update now or later. However, this dialog box
only appeared after the automatic update had already been installed and it was irrelevant whether
the user clicked ‘Install’ or ‘Later’. If the user clicked ‘Install’, the application would open a web
page in the user’s default browser showing the patch notes for the version just installed. To alleviate
suspicion from a user, this webpage (http://1clipboard.io/update) was cloned and served to the user
through the malicious server.
Listing 1: Mayall Interaction Pseudocode - Target Code
1 const inj = new Function(conn_port) {
2 net.createServer(function (socket) {
3 // On the receipt of ’exec’ data, execute as a commend.
4 socket.on(’exec’, function (data) {
5 exec(command, (err, stdout, stderr) => {
6 socket.write(stdout);
7 });
8 });
9 }).listen(conn_port);
10 }
3.5. Malicious Exploit Design
While injecting via an update is a viable infection method if the application does not correctly
implement code signing, there remain a number of applications which do code sign and thus
this method may sometimes be impractical. Despite the fact that code signing is in place during
the update process, this security check is not enforced at application runtime and code signing is
disregarded. To this end, if it is possible to gain access to a machine — through a social engineering
or phishing attack for example — it would be possible to modify the application source code to inject
malicious content. This is possible as the Electron executable does not check the code integrity of the
application on runtime.
Listing 2: Mayall Interaction Pseudocode - C2 code
1 const c2 = new Function(local_port) {
2 io.on(’connection’, function(socket) {
3 // Initial agent activation
4 dbInterface.addToAgents(socket.id);
5 socket.on(’hello’, function(msg) {
6 socket.emit(’c2’,’world’);
7 });
8 // Returning a response from a command exection
9 socket.on(’agentChatter’, function(msg) {
10 process.stdout.write(msg)
11 });
12 });
13 // Commands can be sent to specific agents with specific types
14 // Type classification can be seen in line 5 of listing 1.2
15 exports.pushCmd = function(agent, type, command) {
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16 io.to(agent).emit(type, command);
17 }
18 }
3.5.1. Malicious Exploit Design - A Dropper Module
Before the injection of an application is demonstrated, it is necessary to generate a payload that
is able to communicate with and receive commands from a remote Command and Control (C2) server
as demonstrated in Listing 1 representing the target code, and Listing 2 representing the pseudo code
for the C2 Server. As Node.js is the underlying language that Electron is based on, the basic module
was built in Node.js without Electron in mind — Electron is primarily used as the visual bolt-on to
a Node.js application, exposing the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and other interaction methods to
an end-user and Node modules can still be run underneath Electron.
In order to receive commands, a websocket functionality was introduced, opening a port on the
target machine on which mayall.js listen for commands. This can be seen where the payload waits for
data tagged with the string ’exec’, the contents of which it executes in an exec command, writing the
results back out to the socket. Once the module is running on a target machine, it is then possible to
connect with a networking tool such as netcat.
3.5.2. Covertly Embedding Modules
Running a node module outright from the command line, although effective in demonstrating
Node.js capabilities, is not going to have a high conversion rate from payloads delivered to remote
shells returned. In order to have a greater activation rate from the Mayall payload, it was deemed
necessary to embed it within applications that a user trusts and installed themselves. An additional
benefit of embedding an application with the Mayall malware (rather than running it directly) is that
any firewall notifications will be requested on behalf of that injected application. For instance, if
Mayall is injected into Slack — a popular team communication product — any initial firewall request
by Mayall to open ports will appear to come from Slack and not the malicious module. Furthermore,
once this request has been accepted once, it will continue to be allowed to run on future execution of
Slack.
The mayall.js payload is developed further to allow agnostic infection across multiple operating
systems and applications. A list of popular Electron applications is compiled and shipped alongside
the module, complete with an automatic injector. Figure 2 demonstrates the method by which the
payload embeds itself within an application, starting with an initial operating system detection.
After determining the platform it is ran inside (exposed through Node.js’ process.platform
variable) the injector is subsequently handed off to the appropriate dropper module. This module
will search the typical installation locations for Electron applications for the system type and inject
mayall malware into any applications that it discovered.
This is achieved by first extracting the asar archive associated with the application and executing
a read of the .main field from the package.json file located within the archive. This field details
the entry point of the application. If a valid file is discovered, the dropper downloaded the mayall
module into the node_modules folder in the extracted archive. This is followed by a pre-pending
of the entry file with a require statement for the newly downloaded module, causing it to be loaded
into memory when the application next executes. Once in place, the injector then repackages the asar
archive and cleans up any files that were left behind as a result of the execution.
As with many modern day applications, developers of Electron applications exhibit a tendency
to have their applications launch on boot. As a result of this software design trait, persistence is
gained when Mayall is injected into an application which exhibits this behavior — examples include
the highly popular Slack, Discord and Tidal Music applications (Figure 3).
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Figure 2. Flow of execution for injecting malicious modules into trusted Electron Applications.
Figure 3. Framework flow between the infected system and command and control server running
under Mayall.
3.5.3. Executing JavaScript Natively on a Target Machine
As this injection module is written in Node.js, it may be assumed that the Node.js is a necessary
installation prerequisite for executing a successful attack. However this is not the case. If Electron
applications are the target then it is possible to use operating specific scripts (for example, batch
files on Windows or bash scripts on *nix systems) to identify these applications. Once identified, the
injector module can be executed with the Node.js binaries that are provided alongside the Electron
executables. As aforementioned, the Electron application does not concern itself with the integrity
of the code that is being run and as such it would be possible to decouple the main application
code from the Electron application and instead run the malicious code against this decoupled binary
including a cleanup and replacement of the old code base. The Node.js binary can often be found in
unexpected locations. NVIDIA is one such example. When installing the appropriate drivers for an
NVIDIA graphics card, a web helper is also installed for the NVIDIA GeForce Experience companion
application. This applications handles driver updates, game optimisation and the ability to record
and stream gameplay through ShadowPlay. Additionally, this application is installed by default when
drivers are installed for the graphics card.
Contained within this package is a binary titled NVIDIA Web Helper.exewhich upon further
inspection is a Node.js executable which has been resigned by NVIDIA. This provides a binary upon
which malicious code can be run with the added bonus of being signed by NVIDIA, therein bypassing
certain security features provided by Windows — namely application white-listing [4].
3.6. A Framework for Post-Exploitation
In a concerted effort to raise awareness and kickstart the introduction of actionable change in the
JavaScript security landscape, the Mayall Framework will be released as an open source tool for the
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open source community, allowing security researchers to efficiently and effectively drill down on the
security issues plaguing modern JavaScript applications, in a similar vein to other frameworks such
as MetaSploit and PowerShell Empire.
4. Results
This section presents the findings of the investigation carried out on the different applications.
4.1. Scanning Module
The scanning module produced in subsection 3.2 was run against a number of the most popular
applications written in the Electron framework, the results of which can be seen in Table 2.
This shows how many modules are included directly by the developer, followed by the
subsequent total number of modules that are imported to the application through the full dependency
tree. The commits column shows the number of commits behind the master branches in the associated
GitHub repositories, as well as the number of commits each module is behind on average.
Table 2. An automated scan of fifteen popular Electron applications
Application No inc. No deps. Commits Avg. comm.
1Clipboard 24 374 48724 157.23
Atom 56 578 34181 82.36
Caret 29 89 2615 46.70
Discord 10 130 9805 89.14
Ghost 10 45 1014 25.35
Hyper 17 69 2039 29.99
Mattermost 11 85 7652 99.38
MongoDBCompass 86 841 132281 269.96
NVIDIA N/A 116 6425 69.84
Popkey 12 84 11523 177.28
Tidal 13 115 5339 58.03
Slack 97 257 38411 185.56
Tofino Browser 4 277 7365 31.21
SteelSeries 1 4 364 182
Wire Messenger 11 336 19306 70.20
Average 27 227 21803 104.95
In addition, the number of application dependencies were compared to the number of modules
explicitly included by the developers. The results (Figure 4) shows that a linear regression exists
between the number of direct imports and the total number of dependencies. This demonstrates
that a relatively low number of direct imports can result in mass inclusions of additional dependent
modules, vastly increasing the code base with an approximate fivefold increase in total modules
against primary imports. In addition to the GitHub upstream checker, the same applications were
audited against the Node Security Platform and the list of advisories that NSP maintain on npm
modules. Table 1 (previously shown in subsection 3.3) details the number of unique advisories found
along with the highest CVSS score found.
4.2. Update Injection and Malicious Modules
By producing a malicious update package and placing it on a server which responded to URL
requests from Electron applications, it was possible to inject an application which had not taken
basic security measures to ensure server authenticity. If the malicious update claimed a high version
number (such as v.50 when the current version is v.0.8.1) future updates would also be blocked
as the application would opt out of downgrading its version number. Once injected (either through
update hijacking or script running), it is possible to exfiltrate data through the execution of commands
on the remote system.
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Figure 4. Graph demonstrating how an increase in first-hand imported modules directly causes a
compound increase in external imported dependencies.
5. Discussion
5.1. Current Remediations
A number of suggestions have been made to combat the risk of uncontrolled JavaScript in
web and client-side applications, however a lot of these struggle to find their place in the full-stack
JavaScript development environment [31][32]. For example [22] recommends sandboxing remote
code as well as manually importing remote includes by writing the required code directly into the
main source. While sandboxing has been a long discussed issue on the Electron GitHub repository
and work was done by developers of the Brave Browser to reintroduce the Chrome Sandbox in their
forked version of Electron [33], there is still a lot of discussion and work to be done in order to merge
these changes back into the upstream Electron repository [34]. With regards to minimizing external
includes, the issue lies with the Node.js model of programming where small modular includes are a
major part of the language style. Whilst it would be possible to rewrite code from external modules
directly into the source code, it is not the widely accepted or adopted method of Node.js application
development. In addition to this, there are occasions where this is simply infeasible and could end
up causing more harm than good — for instance, with regards to cryptography and authentication
modules. By analyzing how other languages and frameworks handle code integrity, the immaturity
of some elements of Node.js and Electron become clear. [35] poses multiple solutions for ensuring
software integrity including the introduction of ‘file system integrity checkers’, ‘code signing’ and
‘visualization’ in the event of attempted malicious code execution. Whilst some of these elements may
be in the process of implementation, these measures simply haven’t been effectively implemented
in Electron. There have been a number of methods proposed by which arbitrary code execution
could be mitigated in both the context of secure application development and in application runtime
monitoring and threat modelling. One such method is presented by [19] who proposed a tool that
reduced the impact and effectiveness that vulnerable call sites (such as eval and exec) have on a
system. Whilst this research study discusses “[their] runtime mechanism effectively prevents 100% of the
attacks”, they also highlight that “developers who both use and maintain JavaScript libraries are reluctant
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to use analysis tools and are not always willing to fix their code”. This reluctance to employ third-party
security tools suggests the need to push greater security measures into the frameworks and runtimes
themselves, rather than placing the onus on either the developer or the user to enforce good security
practices at runtime. Another solution to protect against malicious modules is based around runtime
modification and surrounds itself with the idea of threat modeling. [36] investigates the process of
creating “access control policies on interactions between libraries and their environment”, giving modules
only the access that they require based on a model of ‘least-privilege’. Whilst this is a potentially
feasible implementation when dealing with server-side JavaScript, this policy enforcement can not be
guaranteed when applied to Electron, as an attacker could have full control over the source code and
execution of the application.
5.2. Strength and Limitations of the Mayall Framework
5.2.1. Git Commit Divergence
As briefly mentioned in subsection 3.2, whilst a notable divergence in commits from the master
branch may not necessarily indicate the certainty of a security risk, it is still enough to raise concern.
This disparity in module update mentality when compared to the urgency and immediacy of updates
seen elsewhere (operating systems, etc.) may have been caused in part by this notion of version
pinning, combined with the prolific lack of code maintenance — an issue that was also noted by [19]
in subsection 2.5. Whilst version pinning will prevent unwanted change (be it breaking API changes
or malicious trojan inserts), it may also simultaneously prevent security updates from being patched
into a system. This was the case when modules in the test sample were found to contain known
vulnerabilities when cross-referenced against the Node Security Platform Advisories List [37]. By
modifying the appScanner.js tool to additionally search for key phrases such as ‘security’, ‘urgent’
or ‘vulnerability’ within the commit messages or issues that are present between the current version
and the version in use, it should be possible to create more meaningful data that developers will be
able to respond to quickly. The primary risk with this method is centered around the list of search
terms that commits and issues are compared against. Each developer and repository has their own
type and there is a risk that tag names will be missed if they are stylized differently (for example a tag
with the name ‘Type: Bug’ instead of just ‘Bug’). If crucial tags are missed, then vulnerabilities could
slip through the net, giving developers a false sense of security that their applications are secure.
The Node Security Platform is making strong steps towards providing a searchable database of
known security vulnerabilities, however more work is required to ensure that module maintainers are
submitting these vulnerabilities to the database as they patch, in order to provide a central queryable
database for all developers.
5.2.2. Update Process
Evergreen applications are gaining greater traction as part of the software development life
cycle. Evergreen here refers to the process of automatic self-updating and is adopted by widely used
applications such as Chrome and Spotify as well as the majority of applications built on Electron.
As a result of this well documented methodology, it is easy to configure an update server which
applications can poll at regular intervals as part of this self-updating process. Consequently, it has also
proved trivial for an attacker to configure a rogue server that mimics expected application endpoints
if developers have not taken basic measures to protect the security of this process.
Whilst TLS encrypted communication and application code signing is not an issue caused
directly by Electron, steps could be taken to enforce these more secure practices. For example, macOS
applications can not be automatically updated unless a valid code signature is provided. Whilst this
is a security feature present in macOS, this ideology could be transferred from the operating system
paradigm into the cross-platform Electron Framework. By rejecting all application updates that do
not have valid code signatures, developers will be forced to move towards code signing in order to
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release a popular and relevant application. Although this may seem like a drastic measure, Google
are performing similar measures with regards to their “Not Secure” stance on web pages that do not
employ HTTPS [38]. In addition to this, the introduction of code signing across the board may help to
unify the fragmented update process currently in place. By calling for a redesign of the process, it may
also be beneficial to reassess the packaging process so that the entire procedure can be made simpler
for developers, potentially with the introduction of certificate acquisition scripts which are a practice
currently recommended by [39] with regards to TLS. This can also bring Linux autoUpdating inline
with macOS and Windows, a platform which is currently unsupported by the Squirrel updater.
5.2.3. Application Signing Against Runtime
While the Program Files directory in Windows requires administrative privileges to write to,
the majority of Electron applications are installed in AppData/Local on Windows which does not
require any special permissions. This places application source code in an unprotected environment
and is free to be modified by any process. In order to protect the system from any malicious activity
caused by a change in source code, code integrity checking mechanisms must be implemented at the
execution stage of an application. This is a process that is not only confined to Windows, as macOS
also suffers the same issue. By running simple scripts with the same privilege of the current user, all
Electron applications can be injected with malware, potentially without any knowledge of this from
the user. If Electron were to implement rigid code signing policies, any malicious changes made to
the source code of such applications would result in a non-execution of the application at launch.
Unfortunately, this change to the framework would create massive breaking changes. If the next
version of Electron was to implement this type of code signing, there may not be anything stopping
an attacker from replacing the Electron binary with a downgraded version which does not check for
code signatures. As a result, application breaking code changes may be required in order to make
downgrading a time inefficient attack for an adversary.
5.2.4. Secure TLS Connections
One major oversight was the lack of transport layer security implementations that allowed for
malicious update injections due to the absence of cryptography on all connections to the update
server. As Electron allowed updates to occur over HTTP, it was trivial to execute a man in the middle
attack and perform arbitrary remote code execution on the target machine. If Electron were to prevent
such connections from occurring, it would prove much more difficult to inject applications in this
way. In addition to this, Electron should issue warnings to developers concerning the downloading
of resources over HTTP and begin deprecation of this plaintext transport mechanism. At the time of
writing, there are no less than 142 individual security advisories on the Node Security Platform for
applications which download resources over HTTP, leaving themselves vulnerable to MITM attacks,
potential code injection and arbitrary execution. This downloading of binary resources through
insecure means opens applications up to the types of attack that have been demonstrated throughout
this paper as an attacker will be able to replace the resource being downloaded with their own
malicious versions.
5.3. Repackaging binaries
The practice of shipping JavaScript applications is becoming widespread, however the act of
resigning a Node.js binary and shipping it as part of a wider product has not been properly observed
or documented in the wild until it was discovered in an NVIDIA package by [4]. By providing the
Node.js binary to vast swathes of users, one of the main barriers to entry for JavaScript malware
is removed. One potential explanation as to why JavaScript malware has only seen a slow uptick
in recent years could be due to the lack of an available runtime to execute it against. As more
applications are beginning to ship with Node.js included either through Electron or as a directly
repackaged binary, it may be the case that a notable increase in JavaScript malware is observed. The
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ability to be able to produce truly cross-platform malware that can run on both servers and clients
across all major operating systems could have potentially catastrophic outcomes.
5.4. Developer Involvement with the Node Security Platform
Although it may be easy for security researchers to pin the blame on the insecure practices of
developers, this is neither helpful nor constructive. In order to remediate the risks associated with
the use of known vulnerable modules, more awareness of the dangers and available scanning tools
must be made available to developers. The npm package manager has the ability to issue warnings
at the terminal prompt whenever vulnerable or deprecated modules are npm installed, however
these warnings do not flag up for every vulnerability listed in the NSP Advisories List.
It is proposed that npm issue a warning detailing the risks of installing these modules and
have developers explicitly accept these risks before the installation continues. In addition to this,
it may be beneficial to warn developers of out of date, dangerous modules at runtime, each time the
application is tested or executed. This upfront alerting mechanism may influence developers to start
taking measures to secure their applications before deployment.
6. Conclusions
In this manuscript a fully-functional framework is presented, demonstrating a technique to
successfully inject user-installed applications with malicious Mayall modules. The framework
presented was made of two primary modules: the injector and the command and control server,
as well as the vulnerability scanning algorithms. By using the Electron runtime as a standalone
executable, the injector was able to execute on the remote host using the Electron and Node APIs
bundled within the Electron binary. Furthermore, by providing the ability to pass eval and exec
parameters to the payload from a remote server, execution is possible not only within the Electron
and Node.js runtimes, but also from the native operating system shell.
The findings drawn from this manuscript signify the need for increased awareness and
action surrounding JavaScript security. As Node.js inevitably continues to grow, the awareness
of risks associated with running untrusted code need to grow alongside it. Unlike other popular
programming languages (such as Python), Electron applications are not compiled directly into
native executables for that operating system (in the same way py2exe would for Python) and are
rather executed via the generic runtime environment that is distributed alongside the application.
This introduces potential and previously unseen risks — as demonstrated by NVIDIA’s packaging
and release of their rebranded and signed Node.js binary — as it provides attackers with a new
increasingly available toolset with inbuilt system interfacing capabilities. Moreover, this study
demonstrated lack of accountability that an Electron binary held for its associated code base. The
ability to entirely rewrite sections of an application without throwing alerts or warnings is a major
risk that could be easily leveraged by an attacker under the appropriate circumstances.
6.1. Future Work
In order to be an extensible framework (similar to Powershell Empire and MetaSploit), the source
code will be made available online for other researchers to contribute. By leveraging the module
dependency nature of Node.js, we plan on building extensions as standalone modules which are
required by the core framework. Moreover, we plan to port popular penetration testing tools such as
Mimikatz onto the Mayall framework.
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